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Context 
 
This paper has been written from a practitioner’s perspective. The author spent 6 
months embedded with the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) command team, 
spending hours in their company during its de-activation. Whether visiting KPC 
headquarters across the country; sitting in meetings at the highest echelons of 
Government; or accompanying the Commander and Deputy Commander to the 
Kosovo Force (KFOR) HQ in Pristina, the author had unprecedented access and 
exposure at the heart of the organisation. As the 19th UK Liaison Officer to fill 
the appointment, the post had contributed to a long and trusted relationship be-
tween the UK and the KPC – in many circles the KPC was considered a ‘British 
Baby’ as it was conceived and established under the leadership of the UK’s Gen-
eral Sir Mike Jackson1, a folk hero to the KPC.  
 
Working to the Commander of Kosovo Force (COMKFOR) in Pristina, the liai-
son officer post existed to provide the eyes and ears for the NATO-led mission in 
Kosovo and to provide the essential linkage between the two organisations at the 
highest level. Provisionally formed on 20 September 1999, the KPC had been 
fulfilling its civil emergency mission for close to a decade. Providing de-mining 
expertise, disaster relief, urban search and rescue and more routine community 
construction projects, the KPC had served its country well. Organised into six 
Protection Zones (PZ) across the country, its HQ was in an old driving school in 
Pristina. Its personnel had been recruited from the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA) which had transformed and downsized into the KPC. The KPC was only 
a transitional arrangement. Designed to absorb many of the KLA membership, it 
was always going to be replaced with a more appropriate structure. During its 
existence, some members of the KPC had been convicted of involvement in seri-
ous crime, which had an inevitable effect on its reputation. However, the KPC 
survived and as time passed, its membership enjoyed deep respect from the 
population. The position in society of senior KPC members in particular, and the 
Protection Zone they served in, was inextricably connected to family and clan-
based influence and power. The KPC also played a significant role, although 
mostly understated, during some of the most tense and difficult periods of Kos-
ovo’s recent history. The uprising and bitter ethnic clashes in March 2004 saw 
the KPC deploy in many of the worst areas in order to reduce tensions amongst 
Kosovo Albanians; tensions that had threatened to destroy communities. Consid-
ered by the Kosovo Albanians to be national heroes, the KPC was generally a 
feted organisation that managed to recruit, albeit in small numbers, across the 
ethnic divide. A combination of international initiatives, stemming from the Aht-
isaari Plan2 sealed the KPC’s fate.  
 
This paper is written assuming some prior knowledge from the reader of the 
Kosovo situation. It describes the last few months of the KPC before de-
activation in January 2009, as an organisation going through a transition. Look-
                                                 
1  General Jackson was the first Commander Kosovo Force.  
2  In November 2005, the Secretary-General appointed Former Finnish President Martti 
Ahtisaari as his Special Envoy for the future status process for Kosovo. According to the 
terms of reference, this process should have culminated in a political settlement that de-
termined the future status of Kosovo. 
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ing at the stakeholders, the risks and how those risks developed, the paper will 
attempt to bring to life the issues that faced Kosovo at this time. The raison 
d’être for this paper is to provide the reader with the opportunity to critically as-
sess the relationship between the international community and the KPC, the is-
sues that dominated this period and to identify lessons for future transitional ac-
tivities. Of course Kosovo was a unique situation; its status was unrecognised by 
the very organisations charged with leading it through this difficult period of 
change. It is impossible to write about Kosovo without touching on the degree of 
complexity, at many levels, that was present. And some stakeholders will attract 
criticism. The paper did not set out to do this; the paper set out to raise some dif-
ficult issues and, where appropriate, explain why a situation occurred and how it 
could have been avoided or dealt with better. It is not the criticism that should 
remain with the reader; it is the fact that the situation existed in the first place.  
 
Introduction 
Approximately 2800 strong with a smaller number of reservists, the 
KPC was only ever a ‘stop-gap’ solution to assist with the dissolution 
of the KLA. The Kosovo Status Settlement3, published in March 2007 
and fully endorsed by the UN Secretary General five months later, ac-
knowledged the requirement for the KPC to be dissolved within a spe-
cific timeframe. In the full expectation of dissolution, during the 
summer of 2007 senior members of the KPC had begun to look for-
ward to the establishment of a new security ‘architecture’. During a 
visit to a KPC field project with LTG Selimi, the KPC Commander, 
Mr Joachim Rücker, SRSG said;  
 
“We discussed the Ahtisaari Plan, which foresees a Kosovo Security Force 
(KSF) and the drawing down of the KPC… We agreed that such a draw down 
must be done with dignity and honour and with the greatest respect for the sacri-
fices and for the contribution that the KPC is making for this society4”.  
 
By late 2007, anticipating the future changes to Kosovo’s security or-
ganisations, NATO established a Military Civilian Advisory Division 
(MCAD), based in HQ KFOR, in order to look at the issue of closing 
the KPC and establishing the KSF. When the Law on the Dissolution 
of the KPC was passed on 15 June 2008, its dissolution had to be 
complete by 14 June 2009. How this was to be achieved was still ex-
ercising the minds of the MCAD planners and other stakeholders as 
late as August 2008. Through the close cooperation of these stake-
holders during the early stages of planning, the task of standing down 
the KPC and standing up the KSF generated a number of options. One 
of the original options was to have a synchronised reduction of the 
KPC with a corresponding increase in activity of the KSF over time 
leading to 14 June 2009. Two other options considered an early disso-
lution and a late dissolution. In fact, after much deliberation, the cho-
sen solution was a combination of all three options. Under the ‘big 
bang’ approach, the KPC was to be formally de-activated at midnight 
and the KSF ‘stood up’ at one minute past midnight. This was initially 
set for December. The day on which the KSF was created was called 
Announcement Day (A Day) when all successful applicants from the 
KPC would learn whether they had been selected for the KSF or not. 
In reality the plan would also have included a period of days leading 
                                                 
3  Fully endorsed by Ban Ki Moon, the UN SG, this document paved the way for Kosovo’s 
Constitution. 
4  UNMIK Press Conference 28 June 2007,  
http://www.unmikonline.org/DPI/PressRelease.nsf/0/676D723C3CA10D5EC1257308005
8432C/$FILE/pr1688.pdf  
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up to A Day when the KPC were sent home. There were many reasons 
for this choice; by August 2008 there was a fear that any other option 
could have seen a rapid collapse of the KPC. The evidence supported 
this view; attendance was dropping, projects were yet to be completed 
and some senior voices in the KPC warned the KPV leadership that 
there could be incidents of disobedience by the KPC members unless 
the plan was tightly controlled.  
 
This resulted in the overall process of dissolution being separated into 
two further phases; de-activation and demobilisation. Demobilisation, 
a relatively straightforward functional process, was an internationally 
recognised activity and therefore relatively easy to understand. KPC 
personnel needed to be demobilised before the Corps could be dis-
solved. De-activation however suffered from a lack of a direct transla-
tion in Albanian, which immediately became a source of significant 
misunderstanding. This misunderstanding, which existed amongst the 
KPC and the local national media, left people unsure as to the differ-
ence between dissolution and de-activation. The term de-activation is 
described in the next paragraph. This initial example of how a simple 
message could not be explained successfully was a symptom of 
greater problems to come.  
 
The ingredients required to describe the de-activation of the KPC as a 
transition are mostly present and it is therefore key to understand its 
context. De-activation was the end of official work for the KPC. At 
de-activation KPC members would either report for duty with the KSF 
or they would go home. They would still be paid for 6 months until 14 
June 2009 when they would receive 12 months severance pay and 
they would be able to enter a resettlement programme immediately 
after de-activation. For most, a pension would also be available. So 
the KPC was heading for a change of condition; one that would inevi-
tably generate intended and unintended circumstances that would play 
out during the process of de-activation and beyond. The consequences 
of these circumstances varied widely as the paper will explain later.  
 
This paper will consider NATO’s New Tasks and provide an assess-
ment of the actors involved who influenced events from different 
viewpoints and with different agendas. The challenges that faced these 
stakeholders and the risks to the process will be highlighted using fac-
tual accounts of events leading up to the de-activation of the KPC. 
What went wrong during this process and why, from the author’s per-
spective, will then be studied. Before a conclusion, the paper will 
draw the reader’s attention to three important lessons identified from 
the de-activation of the KPC; lessons that have a resonance in other 
post-conflict scenarios.  
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The period in question was never likely to be a smooth operation. 
There were arguably too many players with an opinion on what should 
happen, a series of tight timelines made more challenging because of a 
lack of appropriately skilled staff officers assigned to the tasks in hand 
and little consensus. There were friction and strongly opposing views 
at almost every turn, especially between the key international organi-
sations. This lack of unity stemmed from the ubiquitous political 
situation over Kosovo’s status and how certain nations serving in 
KFOR and other organisations approached it. National agendas played 
their part and the newly formed Government of Kosovo (GoK) was 
beginning to flex its muscles. Combined together, this heady mix en-
sured that the New Tasks were destined to achieve the minimum set of 
conditions required for the next stage in Kosovo’s history.  
 

NATO’s New Tasks 
Planning for the dissolution of the KPC, the creation of the KSF and 
the establishment of the Ministry for the KSF (MKSF) had began in 
late 2007, well before NATO’s New Tasks were formally agreed and 
reported to the world’s media on 12 June 2008. The first task de-
scribed the establishment of the new MKSF under the direction of a 
largely civilian-manned NATO Advisory Team – known as the Minis-
try Advisory Team (MAT). Appointed by NATO HQ in Brussels, the 
team was led by a UK 1* civil servant – a grade equivalent in military 
rank to a Brigadier – with an international group of subject matter ex-
perts whose role centred on supporting the creation of the civil-led 
ministry. Although not the primary role of the MAT, it assumed many 
tasks including setting the terms and conditions, writing laws, drawing 
up the organisational structure and writing job descriptions. The own-
ership of this first task lay in Brussels with the UK 1* acting with con-
siderable autonomy. The second task was focused on establishing the 
KSF. This responsibility sat with KFOR’s MCAD. The existing struc-
ture of KFOR was altered to accommodate the new division which 
focused on tasks two and three (see below). During the summer of 
2008, the MCAD received a new 1* Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS), 
who was directly responsible to COMKFOR for the stand up of the 
KSF. Previously MCAD had been led by a German Colonel. With 
DCOS MCAD’s office in the main KFOR Headquarters next to the 1* 
lead for the MAT, the opportunity for liaison over these first two tasks 
was evident and it soon became clear that there was a close linkage 
between them. Whilst the MAT was reasonably well resourced, the 
MCAD remained consistently undermanned. Unfortunately a different 
interpretation of the NATO Secretary General’s intent resulted in a 
number of grey areas developing, which inevitably led to difficulties. 
This will be discussed later. The third task directed the supervised dis-
solution of the KPC by KFOR (MCAD).  
 
Wrestling with NATO’s New Tasks, the small staff within the 
MCAD, working closely with other stakeholders, developed a frame-
work of planning meetings – or pillars – in which to take forward the 
New Tasks; pillar one to establish the civilian-led ministry, pillar two 
the stand up of the KSF (with the task to stand down the KPC) and the 
third pillar focused on the dignity aspects of dissolution for the KPC5. 
Establishing clear lines of responsibility proved to be very difficult 
                                                 
5  This included the provision of archiving, the establishment of museums and other appro-
priate commemorative events. In essence, pillar three dealt with the ‘soft’ aspects of dis-
solution. 
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over the implementation of the new tasks. Pillar one seemed relatively 
straight forward with the NATO-appointed MAT driving forward 
preparations for the MKSF. Pillar two also seemed to enjoy a clear 
delineation of roles; KFOR had the responsibility to supervise both the 
stand up of the KSF and the stand down of the KPC. The two activi-
ties were connected with success in one leading to success in the 
other. However, this proved to be a challenging concept. Pillar three 
was set up to ensure dignity was intimately linked to the dissolution of 
the KPC. The lead, on behalf of KFOR, for pillar three was the KPC 
Coordinator, a United Nations-appointed British 2* General, effec-
tively acting as the Minister for the KPC. However, as stated in the 
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, “The 
IMP6, in consultation with the ICR7 and Kosovo, shall have executive 
authority over the KPC, and shall decide the timing of the KPC’s dis-
solution8.” A grey area developed between KFOR and the KPC Coor-
dinator over the lead for this activity and it was a problem that hin-
dered the process of de-activation. The reference to executive author-
ity was omitted when, in June 2008, NATO declared that it will, “su-
pervise the standing down of the Kosovo Protection Corps and super-
vise and support the stand up and training of a civilian-controlled 
Kosovo Security Force, KSF9.” This ensured that the situation was 
open to interpretation and it left many asking what the term ‘super-
vise’ actually referred to. Did it imply leadership and the provision of 
all necessary resources, both intellectual and physical, in order to 
achieve a successful outcome? To most people, the answer was yes. 
 
This ambiguity lies at the heart of the problem. At the same press con-
ference, the NATO Secretary General was asked a question by Chris 
Dickinson10; 
 
“Secretary General, just on the new tasks you mentioned, standing down with the 
one operation, standing up with the other, and also the existing mandate, are 
there any problems from existing allies, existing participants in dealing with 
these particular institutions? I'm thinking particularly of problems with the rec-
ognition of Kosovo and getting involved with different institutions that may have 
a national character.”  
 
De Hoop Scheffer replied:  
 
                                                 
6  KFOR was referred to as the International Military Presence in early UN documents.  
7  nternational Civilian Representative and EU Special Representative – Mr Peter Feith was 
appointed to oversee the implementation of the Status Settlement and is the final authority 
in Kosovo for civilian matters.  
8  Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, Annex VIII, Article 6, UNSC 
26 March 2007, http://www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive_proposal-english.pdf  
9  NATO Press Conference with Secretary General 12 June 2008,  
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-3253B702-
5E536D28/natolive/opinions_7852.htm?selectedLocale=en  
10  European Diplomacy Defence 
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“Well, the answer is no in the sense that given the fact that NATO only decides 
on the basis of consensus, this morning when the NAC, North Atlantic Council 
agreed to the new tasks, it was by definition a decision taken by consensus. So 
the answer to your question is negative.”  
 
Well-meaning statements in front of the media at NATO HQ in Brus-
sels were one thing; applying this intent in Kosovo was quite another. 
Despite plenty of opportunity for a robust interpretation of the direc-
tion given in Brussels and in the Status Settlement, KFOR had other 
priorities, which will be discussed later in the paper.  
 
 

The Stakeholders 
The Government of Kosovo 
Looking first at the fledgling GoK11, Prime Minister Thaci along with 
many members of the Government had been involved in one role or 
another with the KLA12. The depth of understanding within the politi-
cal elite of the KPC and its origins was considerable. The leadership 
of the KPC was equally recognised in official political circles and this 
created an unusual degree of access for those representing the KPC’s 
views. For all the opportunities that this familiarity provided, the inter-
relationships built up during the KLA years between politicians and 
senior KPC officers had also resulted in a high degree of mistrust and 
often open discord. This agenda was not confined to those in power. 
The main opposition leaders had served in the KPC in high office; one 
a former Commander and the other a District Commander. Both 
Agem Ceku and Ramush Haradinaj had also been appointed as Prime 
Minister pre-independence and held strong views on the fate of the 
KPC and the shape of the new KSF; views that were both a help and a 
hindrance. Both men wanted to see a larger KSF than the proposed 
2500 strong force. And they were determined to make political capital 
out of the situation, using the plight of the KPC to criticise the gov-
ernment. The strong ties between families and between individuals, 
dating back to the 1997-99 period, remained strong and influential. 
This was particularly true when these relationships existed between 
members of the KPC and politicians on all sides. It was this depth of 
personal involvement from members of the GoK that enabled them to 
enact their own agendas and to seek influence over a fragile and deli-
cate environment. From early on it was clear that the Prime Minister 
was not a supporter of COMKPC13 and this should have rung alarm 
bells in Film City14. Likewise the determination of the opposition to 
make political capital out of the de-activation of the KPC was an ever-
present threat.  
 
The main responsibility of the GoK was to pass an acceptable KPC 
Pension Law, an integral element to dissolution with dignity. There is 
little doubt that the GoK and others in the political elite wanted to find 
an agreeable solution for the KPC, but the economic pressure to invest 
                                                 
11  At no time during the authors 6 months in Kosovo did KFOR refer to the GoK. Reflecting 
NATO’s lack of formal recognition of Kosovo, KFOR could only use the term IoK – In-
stitutions of Kosovo. 
12  Prime Minister Thaci had been the KLA spokesman during 1998/99. 
13  Commander KPC 
14   Film City was the local name for the HQ KFOR barracks in Pristina. 
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across all the main government ministries inevitably set the govern-
ment on a collision course with the KPC over what was affordable. In 
fact, the GoK’s role in the de-activation process when the Pension 
Law was eventually passed evoked emotions that had laid dormant for 
much of the last decade.  
The Kosovo Protection Corps 
The main stakeholder was the KPC. The organisation was set up as a 
solution to a difficult problem of what to do with the KLA in the af-
termath of Operation Allied Force15 and had achieved some excellent 
results. For example, the KPC de-mining unit that deployed to Albania 
in the aftermath of the Gerdec ammunition explosion in March 2008 
gained widespread acclaim for its efforts. Ironically, the KPC also 
achieved international recognition for its Urban Search and Rescue 
capability in the final few weeks of its existence. However by Sep-
tember 2008 the reality was stark; the KPC was in danger of implod-
ing. The Command team had lost its focus and the result had led to its 
administration, its chain of command, its ability to influence the media 
and its morale, in sharp decline. The reality for some in the KPC was a 
daily routine which involved turning up at work (although this was not 
always necessary) and sitting around drinking coffee until it was time 
to go home. The unifying purpose of providing a civil emergency role 
had clearly been replaced by a fear for the future by the grass roots 
membership. This manifested itself through a growing dissent and 
unwillingness to follow orders. The concept of orders was no longer a 
reliable means of passing information or achieving an effect. The 
KPC’s internal data network relied on insecure hotmail.com and even 
this was rarely used. The mobile phone was the only means of com-
municating between the levels of command. The leadership of the 
KPC was often divided and had over time generated a bipartisan ap-
proach throughout its ranks. There were generally two camps: one 
group supporting the Commander; the other supporting the Deputy 
Commander. Balancing the needs of the Commander and Deputy 
Commander, likely rivals for the position of Commander KSF, was a 
full time task.  
 
For some in the KPC the desire to move on was overwhelming. For 
the lucky few likely to be selected for the KSF, the promise of a better 
future, with better pay, was the prize. For those who did not enjoy 
such reassurance, there was an obvious nervousness over what would 
happen to them and their families. Often poorly educated and influ-
enced by more disruptive members, the KPC’s willingness to commit 
                                                 
15  Op Allied Force was the NATO military action against the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via in 1999. 
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to the transition varied between Protection Zones (PZ)16. The quality 
of PZ commander, its geographical location and its nebulous political 
history, were all factors in determining the degree of compliance to-
wards the process of de-activation. The most interesting fact though 
that emerged during the process was the realisation by the Deputy 
Commander that the KPC was the only organisation with sufficient 
motivation and will to lead the de-activation process. This only served 
to increase the mistrust and disappointment – bordering on resentment 
– felt towards its ‘partner’ organisations.  
The Office of the Kosovo Protection Corps Coordinator 
Sitting above the KPC was the Office of the KPC Coordinator, a UN 
organisation established to oversee the KPC. Answerable to the Spe-
cial Representative of the Secretary General, the OKPCC had the role 
of supporting KFOR over the dissolution (and in this paper the de-
activation) of the KPC. The KPC Coordinator’s pillar three tasks in-
volved a number of coordinating roles involving the Pension Law, a 
resettlement programme, maintaining the integrity and reputation of 
the KPC during the process and planning for the post de-activation 
period. The provision of a reasonable Pension Law for KPC person-
nel, entirely the responsibility of the GoK, was at the heart of the 
problem. By September 2008, this was moving slowly through the 
Kosovo Assembly’s legislative process. The pension issue was fun-
damental to a successful transition for the KPC membership. The cen-
tral challenge was to see the pension law passed in a timely manner 
and with a fair pension provision. Without any direct responsibility for 
the speed of passage of the law and of its final details, the KPC Coor-
dinator could only rely on his position to influence events. After the 
publication of the law, he was expected to commend the benefits to 
the KPC, even though many in the KPC didn’t understand it and saw 
it as an act of treachery.  
 
The implementation of a robust resettlement programme was awarded 
to the UNDP. They in turn appointed a Kosovan employment promo-
tion agency, APPK, for their country-wide local knowledge. The 
UNDP needed to be in step with the announcement of the pension 
provision. The programme also had to satisfy the KPC membership 
who had experienced a discredited pilot resettlement project, organ-
ised and implemented by the IOM17, in 2007/08. There was a widely 
held view that the IOM project had been harmful to those who had 
volunteered. Whether this was true was irrelevant; perception was 
everything, especially in Kosovo. In spite of a well choreographed 
                                                 
16  There were 6 Protection Zones covering Kosovo which were set up after 1999 in order to 
provide command and control to KPC personnel. Their Headquarters was in Pristina. 
17  International Organisation for Migration 
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communications campaign by the UNDP supported by the KPC Coor-
dinator in the days leading to de-activation, there remained a signifi-
cant degree of reluctance to accept the resettlement message across 
some PZs.  
 
Finally, it was imperative that the KPC achieved Dissolution with 
Dignity – enshrined in law and implicit in the third ‘New Task’. When 
it became clear that this was unlikely to happen, the KPC Coordinator 
stepped into the vacuum and gathered many of the tasks, mainly re-
lated to de-activation, and provided the necessary leadership. This in-
cluded encouraging the KPC to plan for an event to commemorate its 
de-activation. This event would give the KPC membership the oppor-
tunity to look back with some pride on its achievements throughout 
the previous nine years. Initial ideas included a parade through the 
streets of Pristina followed by an address from the Prime Minister. As 
events unfolded, this plan reduced in importance and resulted in a very 
low-key ceremony, a decision driven by the KPC Commander.  
 
The KPC Coordinator therefore faced some soft power challenges: he 
needed to influence the GoK to ensure the KPC received a timely an-
nouncement on its pension provision and subsequently ‘sell it’ to the 
KPC; he needed to support the UNDP in order to convince a sceptical 
KPC audience of the benefits of the resettlement programme; and he 
needed to manage the grey area, already alluded to, between the ac-
tivities of the OKPCC, KFOR and the KPC, in relation to de-
activation in particular. Attempting to influence and coerce the GoK 
and KFOR, organisations reluctant to be pushed around, created a de-
gree of risk that was inherent to the plan to de-activate the KPC. In the 
absence of any other stakeholder, the KPC Coordinator gently influ-
enced those directly involved in the de-activation activity. And even if 
some members of the OKPCC, traditionally loyal to the UN, tried to 
add a degree of complexity to an already challenging situation, the 
KPC Coordinator adopted a sensible approach to solving sensitive is-
sues, with a pragmatism missing from many other stakeholders.  
Kosovo Force 
Central to the stand down and stand up of the KPC/KSF sat KFOR, 
the NATO-led international military presence. From the start, KFOR’s 
effectiveness and credibility came under scrutiny over its implementa-
tion of the new tasks. Acting under UNSCR 1244, KFOR did not rec-
ognise Kosovo’s new independent status. As the NATO Secretary 
General said; “… the KFOR mandate will be based on 1244. NATO 
is, as you know, not in the recognition business as far as Kosovo is 
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concerned, so that KFOR mandate will not change18”. For an organi-
sation that had been operating in Kosovo since 1999, its knowledge of 
the culture and its people seemed to be surprisingly weak. This was all 
the more surprising as many from KFOR’s contributing nations had 
returned time and again for tours of duty. By September 2008, a deep 
comprehension of the issues surrounding Kosovo, its people and its 
institutions should have been available in order to better inform the 
de-activation process. The corporate knowledge, built up since 1999, 
needed to be unlocked and applied to the analysis underpinning the 
de-activation plans. The MCAD needed to be resourced with appro-
priate manpower to be able to deal with this significant set of tasks. 
Instead, KFOR’s focus remained fixed on the provision of a safe and 
secure environment and freedom of movement (SASE/FOM), a mis-
sion drawn from UNSCR 1244. NATO’s New Tasks and the dissolu-
tion of the KPC in particular, was never on KFOR’s main effort. 
Whether this was driven by the need to remain neutral to Kosovo’s 
new status or whether it was as a result of the continual rotation of key 
posts every 6 months is unclear. 
 
Directed by the NATO Secretary General in Brussels to provide lead-
ership over the dissolution of the KPC and the establishment of the 
KSF, KFOR was reluctant to face contentious issues, no doubt influ-
enced by its position vis-à-vis Kosovo’s status. It was accused from 
many quarters of being risk averse. There was also an opinion that 
KFOR viewed the KPC in a patronising and paternal manner, treating 
with disdain the very difficult task facing its members. The leadership 
promised in Brussels appeared to be absent, which undermined the 
whole process. The need to set the conditions for a successful estab-
lishment of the KSF was inextricably linked to the efficient de-
activation of the KPC. This point seemed lost. As a result, the respon-
sibility for leading the process through to de-activation fell, not to the 
capable and very well resourced KFOR, but to the comparatively dys-
functional KPC, supported wherever possible by well intentioned offi-
cers in MCAD and by the KPC Coordinator.  
 
Looking at KFOR’s role in this transition, the change of conditions 
and impact on the KPC personnel was perhaps obvious but the threat 
to the well-being of their families was not considered. More generally, 
without investing in sufficient analysis of a situation, the ability to 
deal successfully with second and third order issues is diminished. In 
effect, this is what happened. Pressure from families and other exter-
nal organisations, such as the powerful KLA veterans associations, 
was played out through the KPC members. KFOR had a knack of un-
derestimating the role of other key stakeholders in the process, includ-
                                                 
18  NATO Press Conference 12 June 2008, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-3253B702-
5E536D28/natolive/opinions_7852.htm?selectedLocale=en 
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ing the GoK and the KPC. As the de-activation plan unravelled in 
parts of the country, KFOR identified the KPC membership as the 
source of disruption instead of trying to understand the causes of their 
discontent. When the possibility grew that the new tasks could fail, 
there was a scramble to do something and it was only at the end of the 
process that KFOR began to apply resources to avoid this scenario. 
Most observers agreed that by September 2008, the basic conditions 
necessary for an efficient process of de-activation had not been set.  
KPC De-activation: The Risks 
The number and severity of risks that threatened KPC de-activation 
were wide-ranging. The undefined role played by KFOR, the absence 
of a strategic communications plan, the role of the KPC leadership and 
many others contributed to a complex and constantly evolving picture. 
Here they are considered. 
 
During this period there was a key piece of work running in the back-
ground; negotiations to transfer executive authority of the KPC from 
SRSG to COMKFOR. Notwithstanding SRSG’s unwillingness to con-
tradict UNSCR 1244, there was a mutual understanding from both 
sides that a compromise was necessary. Driven by the UN’s strategic 
reduction in Kosovo and the imminent arrival of EULEX’s Rule of 
Law Mission, the need to pass executive authority to KFOR was 
pressing. This reflected directions given in the Status Settlement19 and 
Kosovo’s Constitution, a document endorsed by the UN SG. To rein-
force this point, KFOR’s role as the International Military Presence 
was stated under Article 154 of the Constitution;  
 
“The Kosovo Protection Corps shall be dissolved within one year after entry into 
force of this Constitution. Until such dissolution, the International Military Pres-
ence [KFOR], in consultation with the International Civilian Representative and 
the Republic of Kosovo, shall exercise executive authority over the Kosovo Pro-
tection Corps and shall decide on the schedule of its dissolution20.” 
 
The Law on the Dissolution of the KPC stated that executive author-
ity; “shall initially be conducted through the office of the OKPCC, 
which shall cooperate with the IMP [KFOR] on all matters pertaining 
to the dissolution21.” Notwithstanding this apparent contradiction, it 
remains difficult to argue against KFOR’s moral duty and authority to 
dissolve the KPC. This position therefore went further than the NATO 
Secretary General’s direction for KFOR to ‘supervise’ the dissolution 
of the KPC. That KFOR chose to retain its focus on SASE/FOM was a 
risk; one that potentially undermined the transitional activities being 
forced on the KPC. Notwithstanding a clear mandate to take the lead 
and impose itself on the situation, the general view was that KFOR 
fell short.  
 
                                                 
19  See footnote 8. 
20  Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, dated 15 June 2008,  
http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kosov
o.pdf  
21  Law on the Dissolution of the KPC, dated 13 June 2008. 
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The key risk though was the absence of a strategic communications 
plan. Throughout the drawdown of the KPC, the lack of a coordinated 
message to the people of Kosovo, the KPC and the media in particu-
lar, had the most negative impact on the process of de-activation. The 
lack of any media lines was driven by NATO HQ in Brussels, which 
directed KFOR to be reactive with the media rather than proactive. 
This policy was highlighted in the first few days of the new 
COMKFOR’s tenure. During a brief meeting at KPC HQ between 
COMKPC and COMKFOR in the presence of the national media, an 
aide explained that COMKFOR would not make any statement to the 
press. An excellent opportunity to set out his thoughts on the KPC and 
to engage with the media was lost. The following day, one newspaper 
ran this story with a throw away line reflecting his silence. 
COMKFOR was troubled by this minor criticism which suggested a 
degree of discomfort with either the KPC or the media.  
 
Essentially, no organisation had the lead for a coordinated strategic 
communications plan and the result invited disaster. The KPC media 
office was losing interest and effectiveness by the day and the KPC 
Coordinator was focused on explaining the benefits of the pension law 
and supporting the UNDP/APPK resettlement programme communi-
cations plan. The KPC Coordinator was also restricted, as a UN offi-
cer, in what he could say to the media. This situation therefore left 
KFOR exposed and impotent in the eyes of the media and the KPC 
membership. During this period in the KPC HQ’s smoke-filled of-
fices, there was disbelief at each round of stories. Both the Com-
mander and Deputy Commander were incensed that the media was 
able to have such a negative impact on the de-activation process. 
Many a raki22 was downed by the Commander’s support staff who 
pored over every copy of every newspaper. Tensions were high and 
nobody knew when it would end. The risk of an increasing number of 
rogue elements in the KPC feeding the press was likely to lead to lo-
calised problems, particularly in more unstable areas. The lack of any 
message from KFOR was unhelpful. This risk, above all others, 
proved to be a force multiplier for the disaffected KPC membership. 
This situation was observed first-hand by KFOR’s network of liaison 
teams, which were embedded in the Multi National Task Forces, lo-
cated geographically throughout the country and working closely with 
each PZ. This Inspectorate provided a regular picture of the growing 
unease within the KPC at the grass roots level. However there was lit-
tle evidence that KFOR was willing to adapt to the developing situa-
tion and to manage the emerging risk. It could be argued that KFOR 
should have lobbied Brussels over the need to change its media policy 
                                                 
22  This was a favourite spirit from the region and was generally known as 40% proof mouth-
wash. 
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while there was still time. Instead, the problem was left for someone 
else to sort out23. 
 
The next two areas of risk were closely connected and in many ways 
fed off each other. The KPC leadership, divided and initially unreli-
able, presided over a severely compressed chain of command. The hi-
erarchical structure had all but disappeared. Decisions were made by a 
small but highly influential ‘politburo’; comprising officers who had 
the ear of the commanders. The ever present threat of a division be-
tween the Commander and his Deputy ensured that there were often 
two messages emanating from the KPC HQ; but this could change day 
by day. The fragility of the situation and the KPC’s inability to re-
spond quickly to changing circumstances led to an institutionalised 
lack of trust by KFOR which increased as de-activation date ap-
proached and the pressure grew. Ironically it was as the deadline ap-
proached that the KPC leadership improved its effectiveness and 
started to drive the agenda forward, reflecting a lack of leadership 
from elsewhere. However, the KPC commanders still struggled to 
pass information up and down the chain of command reliably which 
affected its ability to operate efficiently. When a key decision was 
taken or when a key message was agreed, there were no guarantees 
that the grass roots would be given accurate information. However, a 
collection of a few good men, in positions of influence, still retained 
professional pride and made the de-activation possible for the many.  
 
Unintended or not, the consequences led to a secondary risk emanat-
ing from the KPC. A sceptical and increasingly vocal KPC member-
ship posed a very real danger of derailing the process. The lack of a 
robust communications plan and the reduced effectiveness of the KPC 
chain of command began to show in the behaviour of its members. 
Isolated reports of dissent in the pages of the national newspapers be-
came more common place; a practice in clear breach of the KPC Dis-
ciplinary Code. Generally, those who transgressed were interviewed in 
KPC HQ but dealt with leniently by the leadership, perhaps reflecting 
a steadily weakening grip on the discipline of the organisation by its 
commanders. As time went on, individuals were not even interviewed. 
The prospect of change was resisted by many, although not all. Life 
for the average KPC member was, on the whole, acceptable but the 
future was potentially worse; this led to a growing resentment and 
lack of trust in most organisations associated with the deactivation. 
The KPC leadership was held accountable, along with the GoK, the 
UNDP (still struggling to gain ground after the IOM Pilot Resettle-
ment Project) and the UNMIK24.  
                                                 
23  How the ‘message’ was finally addressed with the media involved a solution beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
24  UNMIK did not attract a great deal of sympathy or support from the KPC. 
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The next clear risk surrounds the stand down plan. The imperative to 
find a way forward in order to set the conditions for the establishment 
of the KSF should in theory have seen KFOR leading from the front in 
close cooperation with the KPC and the OKPCC. The original 
MCAD-owned and sponsored stand down plan spanned the entire 
process of dissolution. However, the activity that was required prior to 
de-activation, setting the conditions for the KSF, also became known 
as the stand down plan to which the paper will now refer. However, it 
soon became clear that KFOR would not take the lead. There were a 
series of meetings held in the KPC HQ with every conceivable stake-
holder present. It appeared that there was little consensus over the de-
tail; in fact there was a general appetite to emphasise the negative 
rather than dealing with the reality facing the group. Without any 
other organisation willing to commit itself to leading the stand down 
plan, it was left to the KPC to volunteer to write its own. Clearly ex-
asperated, the Deputy Commander announced that he would take re-
sponsibility for the stand down plan. The relief around the room was 
tangible.  
 
In order to capture the work needed to set these conditions, the plan 
had to be devised, written, distributed and executed against very tight 
timelines. The KPC needed considerable assistance in this task and the 
author spent many hours working through the options with the Deputy 
Commander (who had been appointed by the KPC Commander to lead 
the activity). The stand down plan involved reducing the number of 
base locations from 33 to 7 (+3)25 to reflect the new footprint of the 
KSF, and centralising the men and equipment at a few of the larger 
sites prior to the stand up of the new force. This plan had to be com-
municated to the chain of command with the right message. The plan 
was initially explained to the PZ and independent unit commanders in 
the Deputy’s office. There was a general feeling that it was workable 
and they departed ready to brief their personnel. Unfortunately, even 
though this was a KPC-led plan, the detail was the first direct threat to 
the status quo for KPC members and some simply refused to buy into 
the concept. To compound matters, the long awaited details of the 
pension law were released around the same time by the GoK26. To 
many, this was the straw that broke the camels back.  
 
The final risk, the package on offer to resettle those KPC personnel 
not selected for service in the KSF, never evolved into a significant 
problem, but it added to the overall atmosphere of uncertainty and 
                                                 
25  The +3 was a reference to the need for short term additional capacity to consolidate 
equipment during for a period of months. 
26  The terms of the pension provision were generous for a country operating under such tight 
fiscal rules; the problem lay in the very low basic salary – around Euro 80 per month - for 
the lowest KPC rank. For ten years the KPC had not received a single pay rise and this 
proved too much for many to bear.  
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mistrust in the final few weeks of the de-activation process. Working 
closely with the KPC Coordinator, the UNDP had planned a meticu-
lous campaign to ensure the KPC members had access to a range of 
excellent opportunities in order to transition them into civilian work. 
The financial support for this programme came from a fully supported 
NATO Trust Fund at $19M27. A series of regional offices were estab-
lished by APPK throughout the country, ensuring the resettlement 
programme was accessible by the people who needed it most. Impor-
tantly, the communications campaign was well managed, well targeted 
and effective. However the spectre of the IOM pilot cast a shadow 
over people’s opinions and getting the message across was a chal-
lenge. 
 
                                                 
27  Conversely, the NATO Trust Fund established to support the creation of the KSF at the 
same time had only attracted a fraction of the $45M required. 

KPC De-activation:  
A Flawed Transition? 
Having looked at the risks and suggested how these had the potential 
to influence events, the paper will look at what went wrong and why, 
using real examples to bring these issues to life. It is impossible to rec-
reate the atmosphere during the final days of the KPC. There was a 
growing sense of frustration by the KPC leadership at KFOR’s unwill-
ingness to commit itself. The way the decision was made over the 
KPC-led stand down plan was a perfect example of this frustration. 
Only by understanding the human effects of the transition, the vora-
cious national media and how one of Kosovo’s most respected organi-
sations was driven to strike, can the reader appreciate the difficulties 
facing the international community during this time. The influence of 
host nation politics, the creation of a special government group and 
the untimely intervention from the Prime Minister also add significant 
weight to the opinion that the transition in Kosovo was flawed.  
 
Throughout October, the KPC-led stand down plan began to take ef-
fect. After the KPC finally agreed to write the plan, KFOR was well 
positioned to act as an unequal partner; advising and supporting, but at 
arm’s length. The first challenge for the KPC was to make a workable 
plan that was simple enough to be implemented against a very aggres-
sive timeframe. The schedule of equipment centralisation and the dis-
posal of the KPC locations began in earnest. However, the disposal of 
KPC real estate immediately ran into problems when a previously ob-
scure legal office in the UN28 pointed out that many of the KPC build-
ings would need to be processed through its office; potentially adding 
months onto an already tight schedule. The complexity of this situa-
tion has been simplified here, but there were some locations that the 
OLA considered belonged to the UN. Their disposal needed to be 
conducted correctly. Threatening the viability of the plan, this stand-
off remained for a couple of weeks while the KPC Coordinator was 
out of the country. Although a way forward was identified shortly af-
ter the KPC Coordinator’s return, the issue was resolved by a PZ 
commander. One of the first buildings to be dealt with was simply 
handed back to the local municipality without involving the UN at all. 
This was against the direction issued to the KPC from the OKPCC. 
But the keys were now in the hands of the municipality, there was no 
going back and there was nothing anyone could do to reverse the 
                                                 
28  The Office of Legal Affairs (OLA). 
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move. When the author asked the commander why he had chosen to 
follow this course of action, against orders, he replied; “The UN 
didn’t build that building, the Municipality did.” In one simple act of 
defiance, the UN’s authority had been by-passed and the plan was 
back on track.  
 
The reality of the pension provision following the announcement by 
the GoK did not go down well in some areas. There was a feeling 
amongst the grass roots that the benefits enjoyed by KPC personnel 
during the organisation’s existence were being removed. Their role as 
‘heroes’ in the eyes of the population appeared to be diminishing; in-
dividuals were becoming disempowered and unhappy. It became ob-
vious that the KPC would not go easily, at least in certain PZs. Actu-
ally, many members of the KPC didn’t have it too bad. They enjoyed 
the trappings associated with the uniform but had other lines of em-
ployment. The low basic wage was often supplemented through other 
business and some did very little at work, enjoying free lunches and 
coffees at restaurants in recognition of their status in society. How-
ever, a growing lack of self-worth felt by the membership was evident 
through the increasing number of newspaper articles appearing regu-
larly, much of it anti-Government, questioning the treatment of the 
KPC. One commander in the south of the country became a cause cé-
lèbre with the media. Clearly opposed to the process of dissolution, 
Major Suma effectively prevented his men from applying for the KSF 
(a task that was running concurrently with the KPC stand down). High 
level visits by the KPC Commander and a senior official in the Minis-
try for the KSF could not break the deadlock. Even though the num-
bers involved were relatively low – around 25 – it was symbolic.  
 
The media was having a field day. Never before had the popular press 
had the opportunity to witness the KPC behaving so disloyally. The 
opportunity to heap criticism on the Government was too good to 
miss; and for the first time, the press even started to turn on KFOR. 
The daily stories were entirely one-sided and became incendiary as the 
days passed, with newspapers stoking up unrest in the KPC ranks to 
resist the changes being imposed on them. The situation was careering 
out of control. 
 
Yet the reaction by KFOR was to batten down the hatches and look 
the other way. The daily reports of dissent had an increasingly disrup-
tive effect on the stand down plan, leading many to believe that parts 
of the KPC were on the verge of a mutiny. The muted response by 
KFOR created the space for the de-activation process to be under-
mined. Without a clear line for the media by KFOR, coordinated with 
the KPC press office and the OKPCC, the vacuum was filled with 
whatever the press could dig up. Directly linked to the absence of a 
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clear ‘message’ was this growing movement of insubordination within 
the KPC across all ranks. Their feelings of dwindling self-worth and 
marginalisation grew by the day; added to that the pressure to comply 
with the stand down plan, the stark reality of a future without the 
KPC, the perceived injustice of the Government-backed Pension Law 
and a tarnished resettlement plan all conspired to lead many to dem-
onstrate their feelings publicly. In October, after many warning signs, 
one protection zone, closest to Pristina, decided to refuse all orders 
related to the timetable for the stand down plan.  
 
The author attended a number of meetings between the leadership of 
the KPC and the ‘striking’ KPC personnel. Sitting behind a long table 
in front of a room packed with KPC personnel, the atmosphere resem-
bled a ‘town hall meeting’. Their demands were often based on igno-
rance and rumour. It was a difficult time for everyone; the KPC had to 
face up to an unwanted reality. They were concerned about providing 
for their families. They recalled stories of former KLA members who 
had committed suicide under this pressure after a previous reduction 
in KPC numbers. The atmosphere was emotional, highly sensitive and 
often menacing. At one meeting, an officer stood up in front of the 
KPC Commander and symbolically ripped up the pension law to 
cheers from the room. They were passionate and vociferous in their 
argument against the growing wave of change about to engulf them. 
They felt they deserved more respect and better benefits. In response, 
the KPC leadership was sympathetic; in fact there was little else it 
could do. Buoyed by a tacit support from the KPC Commander, the 
ringleaders were clear that they should be heard at the highest level 
and the situation downward-spiralled extremely quickly.  
 
There were suspicions that the protest was fomented to suit certain 
political agendas from outside the Government. From contacts within 
Kosovo’s political elite, the author was exposed to these views on a 
number of occasions. The possibility that there was direct support for 
the protests from the political opposition was never disproved. The 
reality was of a changing situation that needed to be managed closely.  
 
The general levels of dissatisfaction amongst the protesters soon be-
gan to crystallise. Within days of walking out, the KPC protesters met 
the recently appointed Minister for the KSF. Even without any re-
sponsibility for the KPC he did what he felt to be the right thing in 
order to defuse the situation. This took KFOR and others by surprise 
as the connection between politician and protester was more intimate 
than anybody expected. It also deeply upset the KPC leaders who 
were angered that the Minister had agreed to see the protesters. This 
frustration by the KPC Commander stemmed from the fact that he was 
also pursuing a line into Government in order to represent the protest-
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ers’ views. Host Nation politics suddenly became a central issue and 
the rules of the game had changed again. The growing discontent was 
also stoked up by politicians speaking to the media but without under-
standing the impact of their comments. The Chairman of the Commis-
sion for Security and Internal Affairs, a former member of the KLA 
and KPC, ‘Remi’ Mustafa29, after meeting COMKPC addressed wait-
ing TV crews and expressed his satisfaction at the Pension Law, stat-
ing that, “it is a good package for the KPC”. This comment poured 
fuel on the fires of KPC unrest and was subsequently used time and 
again as the ‘Government’s view’.  
 
Following this escalation the Prime Minister agreed to meet the KPC 
Coordinator, COMKPC and the Minister for the KSF. At the top of 
the agenda was the need to reach out to the wider KPC. As a result, 
the Prime Minister directed that a ‘technical group’, led by the Minis-
ter for the KSF, should be established immediately in order to pull to-
gether other government departments to consider some of the addi-
tional requests that had been made by the protesters. These included 
free bus travel, tax breaks for business start-ups and health care sup-
port for KPC veterans, inspired by the policies of neighbouring post-
conflict Balkan countries. It was an extraordinary example of political 
leverage and influence enjoyed by the KPC. In effect, a few officers, 
led by a Lieutenant Colonel30, managed to mobilise the Prime Minis-
ter to call his government ministers together to deal with their de-
mands. It also served another purpose though; satisfied that they were 
being heard, the strike was called off and the KPC-led stand down 
plan was back on track. 
 
However, the one act that threatened to undermine the linked activity 
of establishing the KSF and de-activating the KPC came out of the 
blue. Running in parallel with the de-activation was the selection 
process for the KSF. The future KSF’s strength was set at 2500, with 
approximately 1400 coming from within the KPC via a NATO-led 
selection procedure. The selection of the KSF Commander was re-
quired before the remaining officers and other ranks could be selected 
because the KSF Commander designate was a member of the subse-
quent boards. The selection board was run by KFOR and held under 
the scrutiny of the International Civilian Office. After the board, a 
name was forwarded to the Prime Minister’s office for ratification 
prior to the President confirming the appointment. Unfortunately it 
                                                 
29  On 2 Oct 09 the EULEX Court sentenced three members of the so-called ‘Llapi Group’, 
which included Rrustem Mustafa (Remi), to prison terms ranging from three to six years 
for war crimes committed in the 1998-1999 conflict in Kosovo,  
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2009/10/
06/feature-02 
30  The Lieutenant Colonel in question was well connected politically which raised the spec-
tre of external interference in the ‘strike’. In January 2009 the leader of the protesters was 
selected for service in the Kosovo Security Force.  
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was at this point that an already brittle plan was effectively ambushed. 
The Prime Minister was reluctant to endorse the nominated candidate. 
A decision that was due at the beginning of November was delayed 
until the third week in December. The outcome of this intervention 
was significant; the de-activation day had to be pushed to the right by 
a month with a domino effect on selection boards. Rather than an or-
derly selection process run by MCAD, boards were convened at short 
notice and without the full complement of appropriately experienced 
advisors from MCAD and the OKPCC. The implications for MCAD 
were serious with some key staff due to end their missions during the 
Christmas period. The timing could not have been worse for the new 
MCAD team members. The MCAD had been KFOR’s focus over all 
matters relating to KPC stand down and KSF stand up business, albeit 
under resourced and under pressure. The new MCAD officers, unfa-
miliar with the background and using a fragile database, were thrown 
into the deep end to complete a delayed and hugely intricate plan.  
 
Whether this intervention could have been avoided is pure conjecture; 
certainly a greater understanding of local politics and time spent ana-
lysing ‘what ifs’ may have resulted in this scenario being considered. 
It would be too harsh to put the blame at any one door. As with most 
unexpected situations, it is not that the event occurs in the first place 
but how an organisation reacts to it. With depressing inevitability the 
seriousness of the impact on the KPC/KSF plan was ignored, despite 
some clear warning signs. While the situation was still recoverable, 
the author suggested to DCOS MCAD that KFOR should attempt to 
influence the PM to speed up the ratification process in order to keep 
on track with the MCAD plan. The reply was telling; “It is not our 
job”. However, Kosovo’s Status Settlement makes it quite clear;  
 
“In fulfilling the IMP's [KFOR’s] responsibilities, the Head of the IMP [KFOR] 
shall have the authority, without interference or permission, to do all that he/she 
judges necessary and proper… to carry out its responsibilities31.” 
 
Eventually the pressure grew too much for KFOR and the wider inter-
national community. The Prime Minister was lobbied by a range of 
senior military and civilian members from the International Commu-
nity in Kosovo. When the PM finally endorsed the recommendation 
(the original candidate) he did so in his own time and when it suited 
him. The consequences though were significant with the delay ulti-
mately leading to widespread unrest32. This period of uncertainty 
brought into sharp focus the danger of viewing processes as purely 
                                                 
31  Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, Annex 11, Article 2.1, 26 
March 2007.  
32  Errors in the administration of announcement day and crass decision making by key 
stakeholders provoked street protests and a U-turn on KSF selection procedures.  
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technical issues. The people and politics were ignored and the PM’s 
intervention proved the dangers of doing so.  
 
Finally, the resettlement programme, UNDP-led and meticulously 
planned, had one major challenge to overcome. As described, the IOM 
Pilot Project had already cast a shadow over resettlement. At one 
stage, the KPC Deputy Commander was called to speak to KPC per-
sonnel from the PZ based in the divided town of Mitrovice. At the 
height of the ‘strike’, there was a fear by the PZ Commander that his 
men were about to walk out. Tensions in Mitrovice always had the 
potential to escalate. During the face to face meeting that ensued be-
tween the Deputy Commander and about 150 KPC members, the issue 
of resettlement was raised and the role of APPK was questioned in 
disparaging terms. One KPC member was incredulous that the APPK 
could possibly help him during his resettlement. He asked; “What can 
the APPK do for me? I have never even heard of them”. But why 
would that KPC officer have needed the services of an employment 
agency during his ten years in the KPC? The decision to select the 
APPK was not without risk; trying to sell the virtues of an employ-
ment agency in a country suffering 40% unemployment was always 
going to be difficult. It exposed the depth of the problem to be over-
come by the UNDP if the resettlement programme was to succeed; but 
succeed it did33.  
 
                                                 
33  As a post script, as at 30 Sep 09 the UNDP programme had 1571 former KPC personnel 
registered on their programme, 98% of the total available to register (1609), and had spent 
approximately $5.7M. Source; KPC Resettlement Programme, 2009 Third Quarterly Pro-
gress Report / 30 Oct 09. 
Lessons Identified 
This paper by design has not included every issue that had to be nego-
tiated before KPC de-activation. Instead it has focused on some of the 
key challenges that applied the greatest influence on events; events 
offered to the reader as lessons to be indentified for future transitional 
situations. The three major lessons that can be drawn from the de-
activation process are: the critical need for a robust communications 
plan; the need to understand the role played by culture within the 
country in which the transition is taking place; and the precondition of 
clear lines of responsibility between all the main stakeholders, coupled 
with strong leadership. 
 
Taking each lesson in turn, the paper examined the impact that re-
sulted from the lack of a coordinated strategic communications plan. 
The plan needed to target the KPC, its family members, the wider 
Kosovan public and the Kosovan media. Its absence had a corrosive 
effect on the progress of the stand down plan, which was the essential 
element underpinning the process as a whole. Into the vacuum stepped 
some of the inter-clan, inter-family divisions and prejudices that had 
been hidden under the surface for many years. These prejudices were 
held not only by the more militant-minded members of the KPC, but 
also by some in Government. A lack of dialogue with these stake-
holders by KFOR increased the opposition to change and was a fun-
damental flaw. In the final weeks of the KPC’s life, after the main dif-
ficulties had been resolved, a low budget, low-key KFOR media cam-
paign was finally produced which targeted Kosovan television and 
radio channels. Quite why the campaign took so long to arrive remains 
a mystery. Some suggest that national caveats within KFOR’s media 
operations organisation prevented any significant engagement with the 
KSF/KPC issue. The reaction by KPC personnel was generally posi-
tive, but by this stage in the process the KPC were resigned to their 
fate and it was all too little, too late. To understand the origins of this 
situation the reader needs to go no further than the policy from Brus-
sels, preventing KFOR from taking a proactive role in its relationship 
with the media. The resulting conditions saw the de-activation process 
attacked by the press and struggling to regain the initiative. A strong 
and unequivocal message needed to be conveyed to the target audi-
ence; this did not happen in Kosovo during the de-activation of the 
KPC.  
 
The second lesson identified, that of the cultural challenge of impos-
ing the de-activation on the KPC, should have seen the odds stacked 
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well in KFOR’s favour. After all, NATO’s second largest operation 
had been in Kosovo for nearly ten years. Many of the senior officers 
leading NATO’s effort had deployed to Kosovo many times. 
COMKFOR, who was charged with implementing NATO’s New 
Tasks, had himself been the Deputy Commander. He already knew the 
key actors in the country and was familiar with their backgrounds, 
their loyalties and the way they did business. Theoretically, then, the 
behaviour of host nation politicians and the wider KPC should have 
been anticipated. At the very least it should have been identified as a 
risk and mitigated against during the planning stages; ten years of fa-
miliarity should have provided plenty of evidence that unexpected 
twists and turns would occur during this process and contingencies put 
in place to deal with them. The striking KPC personnel and the PM’s 
role had a detrimental effect on progress. Ultimately this resulted in a 
reworked and rushed plan that although outside the scope of this pa-
per, provided rogue elements both inside and outside the KPC organi-
sation the opportunity to create chaos in pursuance of their own agen-
das at the strategic level.  
 
During the preparations for the de-activation of the KPC, there were 
too few qualified personnel assigned to the task of analysing these 
risks, reflected in the undermanning experienced by MCAD. This lack 
of engagement resulted in insufficient focus being given to the cultural 
aspects of the operation. Also, some objectives held by the Interna-
tional Community were at odds with the wishes of individuals occupy-
ing senior positions in Kosovo’s Government. The selection of the 
KSF Commander was one example. The Host Government demon-
strated a growing confidence and independence in its dealings with the 
International Community. The absence of engagement at the right 
level throughout the de-activation of the KPC and establishment of the 
new KSF is a significant lesson to be identified. 
 
Finally, the absence of clear leadership over the implementation of 
NATO’s New Tasks was deeply unhelpful. KFOR was directed by 
Brussels to ‘supervise’ two of NATO’s New Tasks in Kosovo, but 
how this was interpreted was the root cause of misunderstandings 
amongst the stakeholders and it never reached a satisfactory state of 
agreement. The path of most resistance was frequently chosen ahead 
of a practical and common sense approach. When the development of 
a stand down plan was becoming a critical activity, the KPC took the 
lead, developed its own stand down plan and made it work; effectively 
the KPC de-activated itself. Whether the KPC had the critical compe-
tencies to achieve this challenge was questioned at the beginning, but 
in the absence of any other organisation willing to assume the role, all 
stakeholders had to accept that the KPC was in the lead.  
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It may not have been the ideal solution to the de-activation problem; 
but at the time it was the only solution. The fact that KFOR should 
have led the stand down plan, in the view of many including those in 
the KPC, reflects the discomfort felt by KFOR over the ‘New Tasks’. 
Having an unequivocal lead for such a complicated process, one that 
has ‘buy-in’ from each major stakeholder, is vital. The example of the 
KPC de-activation demonstrates this. Only with unambiguous roles 
and responsibilities between the international organisations and the 
host nation can any operation on this scale be concluded with any de-
gree of success. 
 

Conclusion 
It is fair to say that the de-activation of the KPC could have been 
completed without a delay. It would also be fair to conclude that many 
of the problems encountered along the way were preventable. How-
ever, as the reader will have observed, it was an intensely complicated 
environment in which to gain a consensus. There were too many 
stakeholders, too much friction between them and too little appetite to 
take the lead. And even now the issue of the ‘New Tasks’ remains a 
divisive issue for those involved in their implementation. 
 
One can only speculate why the difficulties described in this paper oc-
curred in Kosovo during one of the most important periods in its re-
cent history. Perhaps the political delicacy of the unilateral declaration 
of independence was at its heart; the UN did not recognise Kosovo or 
its Government and neither did KFOR or NATO34. This was an in-
congruous situation which served to divide KFOR’s efforts and con-
stantly act as a barrier to progress. The curious collection of contribut-
ing nations provided a fascinating insight into the inner workings of 
the NATO-led mission in Kosovo.  
 
Even though the North Atlantic Council (NAC) had agreed to imple-
ment the new tasks, the national representatives on the ground ap-
peared to apply their own interpretation of that decision. There were 
rumours that the Ministry Advisory Team had to change its name to 
the NATO Advisory Team at the request of a major KFOR contribut-
ing nation because of the suggestion that KFOR (and by default 
NATO) recognised the new Ministry and hence Kosovo’s Govern-
ment. Another example neatly captures this issue; for most KFOR 
contributing nations the Kosovo Security Force was not abbreviated to 
KSF but Ksf. Unwilling to recognise Kosovo’s new status, KFOR ap-
peared to devalue the new force by removing the capital letters from 
its title. This type of detail was repeated in other areas of activity and 
only served to inject an unhelpful and unnecessary atmosphere be-
tween the KPC, the GoK (or IoK) and KFOR.  
  
The paper introduced the constituent parts to the dissolution of the 
KPC. By focusing on the first, the de-activation, the paper has at-
tempted to raise many issues that were at the heart of this activity dur-
ing a transition dominated by politics and emotion. The real-world 
                                                 
34  Even though some contributing nations in KFOR chose to act in line with their own coun-
try’s recognition of Kosovo, many operated firmly under UNSCR 1244.  
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examples included in the paper were designed to bring to life the prob-
lems faced by the stakeholders who were, to a greater or lesser extent, 
charged with achieving success. The paper has not attempted to define 
success in this instance; the need to meet the conditions for the crea-
tion of the new Kosovo Security Force was the overwhelming priority. 
And all this needed to be completed with some dignity. Certainly, the 
image of the KPC on strike was far from dignified.  
 
The relationship between the international community and the host 
Government was often strained; even the relationships within the in-
ternational community suffered from significant friction. The spectre 
of Kosovo’s status infiltrated every decision made by KFOR and this 
had a direct impact on achieving de-activation. The role of individuals 
and organisations conspired to make this process demonstrably more 
difficult than it needed to be. The establishment of the KSF suffered 
as a result and the close linkage between the two tasks was inherently 
risky but unavoidable.  
 
However, the facts are indisputable. The KPC was de-activated within 
the strategic timeframe set by Kosovo’s Constitution and under the 
circumstances envisaged in the Status Settlement. The de-activation 
and the conditions for the eventual dissolution of the KPC were 
achieved. And it was largely down to a few motivated and profes-
sional-minded KPC personnel who ensured that it happened with as 
much dignity as they could muster. Hence, without the KPC making 
the difficult choices, the process is unlikely to have happened satisfac-
torily. It could be argued that it was the KPC that saved the day, not 
the international community. 
 
On 14 June 2009, a very small, simple ceremony took place, organised 
by the KPC legacy cell which had been responsible for providing ad-
vice and support to KPC personnel post de-activation, and attended by 
a handful of respected international officers who had remained deeply 
engaged in the activities of the KPC in the lead-up to its final dissolu-
tion. The event marked the final act in the life of the KPC.  
 
By including the events described in detail here, the paper has high-
lighted the issues that emerged from the de-activation of the Kosovo 
Protection Corps in the hope that future post-conflict transitions will 
benefit from them.  
 
 
